Poppers Falsifiability As A Criterion Of Demarcation

Poppers Falsifiability As A Criterion Of Demarcation The problem of demarcation has long preoccupied philosophers of science who wished to differentiate pseudo-science from science itself. Many solutions have been attempted, but it is still, in my opinion, Poppers falsfiability which addresses the demarcation problem most effectively. This paper will therefore argue for a revised use of falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation. To argue this point, a clear explanation of Poppers falsfiability criterion will be attempted, as well as an examination of the criticisms falsifiability has received, specifically in relation to the Duhem-Quine problem and Kuhns problem of incommensurability. This paper will then conclude with a discussion of ad hoc modifications and ultimately demonstrate that falsifiability can convincingly demarcate science from pseudo-science. Early on in his book Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, Popper notes that the Logical Positivists differentiated science from pseudo-science by its empirical method; in other words they believed that science relied on induction from experience while non-scientific disciplines did not. This, according to Popper, was untrue, since fields such as astrology, a pseudo-science, also used induction from observation to justify their claims, relying on things such as horoscopes, biographies, etcà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦ Unsatisfied, Popper notes that although some pseudo-scientific claims might be just as truthful as scientific ones, the problem of demarcation needed to be solved so that philosophers, scientists and the public alike could distinguish scientific theories from those which merely pretended to be scientific. Verifiability was seen as a solution to the problem of demarcation for philosophers such as Wittgenstein, but not for Popper, whoargued that pseudo-scientists relied very much on verifiability in order to convince their peers of the scientific status of their theories. This point is illustrated in Poppers anecdote in which Alfred Adler supports his theory of inferiority feelings by his thousand-fold experience. This personal experience convinced Popper that the very ability of pseudo-scientific theories, such as Marxism and Freudianism, to incessantly confirm their predictions, in other words with overwhelming verifiability, was in fact the strongest argument against them. Verifiability, therefore, could not be an adequate criterion of demarcation. Before further exploring Poppers explanation of falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation, it is important to draw a distinction. While Popper uses the terms falsifiability and testability interchangeably, this paper will not. Falsifiability, in this paper, will be seen as the possibility of a concept being both theoretically and practically falsifiable, while testable will be restricted to things only falsifiable in practice. This distinction is important as it entails that, if falsifiability is to be used a criterion of demarcation, theories which can only be falsified in theory, such as Newtons second law, can in fact reach scientific status. Indeed, although there is no place in the universe in which no forces will be exerted on a body, Newtons second law remains falsifiable (not testable) and therefore can still be viewed as scientific. Testability would be too restricting as a criterion of demarcation. Popper explains that the value of falsifiability lies in its risk. If a theory is falsified, it is subsequently refuted by the scientific community. Pseudo-sciences, it is argued, attempt to avoid falsifiability either by providing unfalsifiable predictions or destroying their falsifiability through ad hoc modifications, a procedure he calls a conventionalist twist. The first case, that is providing unfalsifiable predictions, is exemplified in Poppers view of Astrology. Astrology makes predictions and prophecies in such a vague manner, that it is impossible to falsify their predictions. For example, predicting that today Libras will counter an emotional block in one of their long term goals is not falsifiable: practically any event can be interpreted as an emotional block in a long-term goal. By escaping falsifiability, astrology has in fact prevented itself from reaching scientific status. Poppers second remark on pseudo-sciences, that it is about those which escape falsifiability through ad hoc modifications, has been much more controversial, inspiring much criticism from other philosophers of science. However, before addressing the issue of ad hoc modification, this paper will address the criticisms of falsifiability known as the Duhem-Quine problem and Kuhns problem of incommensurability in order to prove a much needed revision of Poppers falsifiability. The Duhem-Quine problem is a strong criticism of Poppers falsifiability. It was first proposed in Pierre Duhems The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. The Duhem-Quine problem revolves around the idea of holism, which explains that any given system, such as a proposed scientific theory, relies heavily on its components ability to work together as a group. Duhem proposes that the theories of physics cannot be tested in isolation, as the testing theories of physics themselves require the use of auxiliary hypotheses, a stance known today as confirmation holism. This argument can effectively be extrapolated to all the sciences, thus entailing that the testing of scientific theories relies on the use of materials and methods which themselves rely on other theories. For example, when testing a theory that predicts the position of certain stars, one uses a telescope, a tool built on the assumption that our theories on electromagnetic radiation are both correct and accurate. The Duhem-Quin e problem thus proposes that the testing of isolated theories is impossible, a proposition which can be seen as an attack on the use of falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation between scientific and pseudo-scientific theories. The act of falsifying can be understood as comparing a theorys predictions to the results of experimentation. If the theorys predictions are found to be different from the experimentation results, the theory is falsified. This is problematic for subscribers to confirmation holism who accept the fact that falsifying a theory can only establish that there is an error in either the theory or our background assumptions, and not where, or even what, the error is. Therefore, if it is assumed that the testing of any theory relies on many different background theories, all scientific theories could escape falsification by simply transferring the error to its background theories. Referring back to the telescope example, if a theory inaccurately predicted the position of Pluto, this theory could escape falsification simply by stating that the error lies not in its prediction but within the theory of electromagnetic radiation. This is problematic for Poppers use of falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation as the falsification of an isolated scientific theory would be impossible. This, in turn, would mean that the testing of theories, scientific or pseudo-scientific, holds the inherent characteristic of escaping falsification, making falsification an impossible criterion of demarcation. To answer the Duhem-Quine problem, Poppers use of falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation must be revised. It must be conceded that the process of testing a scientific theory in isolation is unfeasible, as our methods of testing themselves rely on background assumptions. Yet, it does not make falsifiability obsolete as a criterion of demarcation, just more exhaustive. Unlike as Popper had suggested, it is not sufficient for a theory to be falsifiable for it to be scientific. All isolated theories, scientific or pseudo-scientific, attempt to escape falsification by pegging the source of error on the background assumptions of testing. Moreover, it is not adequate to propose that all background assumptions upon which the testing of a theory is based must also be falsifiable in order for that theory to be scientific, as this would be too restricting. Every theory is built upon an infinite number of assumptions, a problem analogous to underdeterminism, and inevitably all theories wou ld be pseudo-scientific. For example, the testing of Newtons laws of motions is based on the unfalsifiable assumption that the human observation of motion is accurate. It is for this reason that I believe scientific theories must not be viewed as isolated propositions, but rather as part of a scientific system which requires the provision of at least one falsifiable method of testing. This is a criterion which the pseudo-science of astrology, for example, fails to meet, as astrology provides no falsifiable method of testing its predictions, while Newtons laws provide falsifiable equations (ex: F=ma) as a method of testing its predictions. It is thus concluded that only scientific systems are falsifiable. Another criticism of Poppers falsifiability has been the argument that falsification does not produce an accurate picture of science, that falsificationist methodologies incorrectly depict science as a sort of pyramid of knowledge, where scientific knowledge is accumulated over time (brick by brick) to provide an ever-progressing image of how the universe works (the pyramid itself). This view of science, heavily endorsed by Karl Popper, is the subject of criticism in Thomas Kuhns book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, where the l[?] problem of incommensurability is introduced. Thomas Kuhn argues that science, as a historical discipline, is in reality not an accumulation of knowledge, but rather a collection of normal science and scientific revolutions. In order to fully appreciate Kuhns argument, it must first be understood what Kuhn meant by paradigm. For Kuhn, a paradigm stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by the members of a given community (Kuhn 175) in this case, the scientific community. Kuhn defines normal science as the period where scientists methodologies and goals are unified within a paradigm; Aristotelian physics would, for example, be a period of normal science where scientists agreed on sciences goal and methodology. Establishing this, Kuhn then proceeds to label science-as-accumulation as a myth. It is argued that different periods of normal science are incommensurable: they cannot understand each other methodologies, goals, taxonomy, etc. and as such, science cannot be seen as progressive di scipline, seeing that its history is simply a collection of different methods, goals and values which have irrationally changed over time. [Scientists] neither test nor seek to confirm the guiding theories of their paradigm (Bjà ¸rhusda) but simply adhere to the rules of science within their paradigm. If this view is accepted, it must be concluded that falsification could not demarcate science from other disciplines, such as the pseudo-sciences, as science is seen not as a discipline requiring falsifiability, but rather a discipline which solely adheres to ever-changing regulations, goals and methodologies. This problem of incommensurability across different paradigms poses a serious problem to Poppers use of falsifiability as criterion of demarcation, although it might not be seen at first. If it is accepted that the goals, regulations and methods of science are ever-changing, falsifiability cannot be viewed as a fixed requirement of science, much less a criterion of demarcation. After all, how could falsifiability provide us with an accurate picture of science if scientific theories do not hold permanently the unchanging desire to be falsifiable? Once again, a revision of Poppers use of falsificationism as a criterion of demarcation is needed. Although I do recognize that the history of science is, to a certain degree, a collection of incommensurable paradigms, I do not believe that the history of science is a correct representation of science as a discipline. I would argue that science is in reality a normative concept, and more of a goal than a historical accumulation of theories. Many philosophers of science, such as Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn and even Imre Lakatos all mistakenly believed that the history of science and science itself are identical concepts, although in my opinion, the history of science is most accurately described by Imre Lakatos. Imre Lakatos argued that, much like Kuhn, scientists did not produce single, isolated theories throughout time, but rather worked within research programs (a concept very similar to Kuhns paradigms). In an attempt to reconcile Poppers falsificationist approach to science with Kuhns incommensurability, Lakatos argued that the history of science was actually the process of falsifying research programmes. In this view, the problem of incommensurability is rendered insignificant, as research programmes (which are substantially equivalent to paradigms) are not required to be commensurable, as each is falsified along the way. This provides a vision of the history of science as an accumulation of falsifiable knowledge. Nev ertheless, ad hoc modifications were observed by Lakatos as being a part of the history of science, and inadvertently attributed to science itself. Although Lakatos history of science approach is eloquent, it is incorrect in assuming that since ad hoc modifications are present in the history of science then ad hoc modifications must be a part of science itself. Ad hoc modifications are undoubtedly a part of the history of science, but they are not part of science as a discipline as they do not conform to sciences normative goals. To illustrate this point, Einsteins formulation of the cosmological constant may be used as an example. In order to justify his Theory of General Relativity, Einstein required a static universe one that [would] stand(s) still and (à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦) not collapse under the force of gravity in a big crunch (Texas AM University). In order to support this claim, Einstein proposed an ad hoc modification, his cosmological constant, a move he later recalled as his greatest blunder. It is here that the distinction between the history of science and science as a discipline can be seen. In truth, over the course o f history, scientists like Albert Einstein have practiced science in many different ways. They have used ad hoc modification to support their theories, a mistake which has been practiced by scientists and pseudo-scientists alike. But science as a discipline is separate from its history, as it is a normative goal which has employed the use of scientific systems, that is, of falsifiable theories and testing methods, in order to gain valuable inductive knowledge about the universe around us, something that pseudo-sciences have not. To conclude, Poppers falsifiability, although convincing, requires [considerable] revision in order to be used as a criterion of demarcation. Indeed, it should be understood that science is a normative discipline where falsifiability is required and where planned modifications take precedence over ad hoc modifications, unlike pseudo-science which satisfies itself in confirming predictions. It should also be understood that this paper does not provide a complete description of science, as many questions remain. Perhaps the most glaring, which was not discussed in this paper due to length constraints, is the problem of how to falsify statements such as all metals conduct electricity, a problem posed by Carl Hempel. Finally, although falsifiability is a requirement of science, it is simply one criterion in a whole set of criteria which distinguish the discipline of science from pseudo-science in a normative attempt to create knowledge through falsifiable scientific systems.

An Overview of Peace and Conflict

AN OVERVIEW OF PEACE AND CONFLICT DEFINITIONS: Peace is often seen as the converse of war. i. e. peace and war as two sides of the same coin. Hence the definition of peace as the absence of war, and that of war as the absence of peace The problem with this definition is that it does not explain everything about peace and war For example even in situations of war, some conditions of peace still prevail. E. g. in spite the long years of hostilities between the Israelis and Palestinians, both have been able to reach a peaceful agreement on the use of their water resources.Secondly, the definition does not take into account the issue of structural violence, in the words of John Galtung. According to Galtung, war represents only one form of violence, which is physical, open and direct. The others form of violence has to do with social conditions of life. This consists of †¢Poverty †¢Exclusion †¢Intimidation †¢Oppression †¢Want †¢Fear and †¢Other forms of psychological pressure So from this analysis, it is possible not to have peace even where there is no war.This is the situation in countries where there is acute poverty, police brutality, oppression of the poor by the rich, use of power to intimidate people by those in power. Even where there is no war in such societies, they may not experience peace (Ibeanu) OTHER VIEW OF CONFLICT: †¢Conflict as the pursuit of incompatible interests and goals by different groups †¢Conflict occurs as a struggle over values. The values may be in terms of physical of material possessions or resources, status or power. (Louise Coser) †¢Central to conflict is the issue of perception.When one party perceives the action of another as preventing or blocking the attainment of a goal, conflict is said to occur. Therefore the two ingredients necessary for conflict to occur are: ? Perceived goal incompatibility ?Perceived opportunity for interference or blocking. In other words, conflict occur s when an intended action is perceived to be inimical or detrimental to the realization of one’s objective Generally perception is a product of man’s physiological, cognitive and cultural dispositions which of course differ from person to persons, and from one environment to another.Therefore, we can say that conflict is inevitable to the extent that it is fundamental to the existence of any institution, body or society It is inevitable because human beings are naturally different from one another in their attitude, perception and orientation. But conflicts could be destructive if not properly handled. Hence we often sat that the way and manner conflicts are resolved differentiates one organization or society from another. VARIOUS PERSPECTIVE OF PEACE †¢To the Instrumentalists: Peace is a means to an end. Here the absence of war serves the objective of social progress and development.In other words, where there is peace, society will experience positive transforma tion in all facets of life. 2. TO THE FUNCTIONALISTS: Peace has a social function of integration and order. That peace is fundamental if society is to function properly. If not the social and political system will experience stress, and then brake down. 3. TO THE PHILOSOPHERS: Many philosophers interpret peace as a natural, original, God-given state of human existence. i. e. , the pre-corruption state of man in society, as God established it. This is the God’s created state of perfection.EXAMPLES OF PHILOSOPHERS †¢St. Augustine of Hippo: He distinguished between â€Å"two cities†, namely; The city of God, founded on perfect heavenly peace and spiritual salvation; and the Earthly city of man, founded on acquisition and possessive mentality of man, but corrupt and always in conflict. †¢John Rousseau: He sees from the angle of a state of nature, the original state of existence of man where there are no desires, where men were naturally good, free and enjoy tranq uility. But this atmosphere was corrupted by human desire and greed for private property †¢THOMAS HOBBESHis argument was that peace is a product of the state of nature where life was poor nasty, brutish and short, and where society was in a state of perpetual war. For men to overcome this sorry state, they resolved to establish a social contract in which each gave up his/her right to self defiance to powerful force (what he called the leviathan) above all to which all were subject, thus creating a more peaceful and orderly life †¢THE HEDONISTS AND UTILITARIANS Argue that human beings naturally seek happiness and avoid pain, and consequently prefer peace to war and violence. PLATO: He addresses the social context of peace. He sees justice as the most fundamental basis of ordered social life. For him, justice is the basis of peaceful social life. Justice is given to each his or her live. Plato defines society in terms of three classes of people: – Workers – eng aged in production – men of appetite – Soldiers – defend the society – men of courage -Rulers – Govern the society – Men of Knowledge Each must operate within his area of competence, and where this does not operate, he sees injustice †¢SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE OF PEACE The Sociologist also addresses the social context of peace †¢The Sociologist sees peace as a condition of social harmony, the absence of social antagonisms †¢Peace to the sociologist, is a condition in which there is no social conflict and individuals and groups are able to meet their needs and expectations This is achieved through the establishment of structures to perform certain basic functions of society; for example a society must service, it must educate it citizens, produce goods government and its often provide security for its members.To achieve these structures such as schools, industries, parliaments, courts and armed forces are established. †¢Th erefore to the sociologists, peace is achieved where these structures perform their functions adequately †¢TO THE MARXISTS: †¢Conflict is a product of dialectical materialism †¢It is a product of the structure of rewards in the society †¢It is a reflection of the nature of class and class struggle †¢This breeds a struggle for the control of the means of production in the society †¢The result of the attendant inequality is in two folds; Violence perpetrated by the upper class on the oppressed – Violence engineered by the oppressed against the ruling class – revolutionary violence. Hence the phrase â€Å"Those who make peaceful change impossible make violent change inevitable† †¢Political Perspective of Peace †¢Politically peace is synonymous with political order when the political structures are stable, we talk of peace in the society: †¢Peace is also seen as a political condition that makes justice possible. The colap se of the political structures lead men to seek other route to enforce their will. These may be in the form of Mob action, demonstration, strikes or even military coups To ensure peace therefore the political structures must be stable and effective to extent that they perform their role. Politically, these must guarantee citizens participation in the political process; ensures tolerance of opposing views; and encourage bargaining and negotiation.Also politically speaking, peace suggests that government does not rely on coercion and the instruments of force (such as army, police) in dealing with citizens Instead people willingly accept and obey the dictates of government Peace in this sense connotes mutual consent and agreement to respect the rules governing a society whether locally or internationally. But the question is whose order? Must every political order be sustained just to ensure peace (e. g. The Nazis, Mobutus, Abacha)

Incumbents and Their Re-election Essay

Statistical research suggests that in 1998 a total of 395 Representatives and 26 Senators were reelected (U. S. Census, 2000). Since the middle of the 20th century and up to the present time, the process of re-electing incumbents has turned into one of the major political trends. The more incumbents sought to reestablish themselves in political office, the more concerned political scholars became about the causes and factors of such political advantage. The current state of political research suggests that a whole set of factors predetermines incumbents’ continuous political success, with access to media and excessive financial resources being the most important elements of political fight. True, those trying to become the members of political office for the first time often lack sufficient political opportunities, compared to resources, which incumbents can access and use in their election campaigns. Reelection of incumbents has already turned into the major political trend in the U. S. , and there are several reasons for that. To begin with, incumbents are frequently referred to as â€Å"the perks of Office†; in other words, all Congress members are given enough material and nonmaterial resources to hire professional staff, whose primary responsibility is to turn their Congress employers into well-represented, widely recognized and well-liked political figures (McKay 140). For example, incumbents can send postage-free letters to their constituents, and can use these as a part of their promotional political campaigns (McKay 140). These are just some out of many benefits which Congress members are being granted by the state. Time is just another component of incumbents’ success in Congress. It should be noted, that Congress is incumbents’ full-time job, and meeting voters, resolving local issues, and participating in public events and television shows are what they are being paid for. It appears that for many potential candidates to run for office and to try to combat an existing Congress member would mean to face the lack of media and financial resources, which for the current Congress members are available on a regular basis (McKay 147). Certainly, all these benefits would be irrelevant and unimportant if not for the image promotion and visibility of all Congress members. It is difficult to deny the fact that â€Å"sitting members of Congress are almost universally recognized in their districts† (Cusdi). This visibility is the direct result of one’s running for office, and after having served two or more years for Congress, its members become widely recognized and accepted among their constituents; and voters are more likely to give their vote to those whom they already know for their Congressional achievements than those, who just start their political career. It should also be noted, that such political visibility is directly associated with incumbents’ ability to organize their promotional campaigns. Having won at least one election campaign, an incumbent is more prepared to face the major political and organizational challenges than his (her) political opponents (McKay 152). Finally, these are financial resources that predetermine incumbents’ political successes. McKay writes that â€Å"for both senators and representatives, money has become a crucial resource in congressional elections. With voters acting in response to the appeal of individual candidates rather than to parties, both incumbents and challengers must ensure that the voters know who they are and what their record is† (169). It appears that in terms of money, incumbents also have significant comparative advantage over political outsiders. Average financial resources available to incumbents are 2-3 times higher than those available to challengers, which makes it impossible for the latter to develop well-grounded media campaigns. For example, in 2002 many Republican incumbents took advantage of â€Å"fundraising visits by President Bush during the 2002 election cycle† (Smith, Roberts & Wielen 74). As a result, incumbents have much more chances to win elections for the second time, and will hardly give their position away to political outsiders. Conclusion A whole set of advantages works to provide incumbents with an opportunity to be reelected. Time, visibility, access to media, and excessive financial resources – all these factors make incumbents less vulnerable to political changes and give them a kind of comparative advantage over political challengers. On the one hand, these advantages seem to make elections unfair, but on the other hand, political outsiders have to develop convincing argumentation that would persuade constituents to change their political commitments, and to give a political beginner a unique chance to run for office.

Rousseau Versus Mill - 1844 Words

The term civil or social liberties is one that garners a lot of attention and focus from both Rousseau and Mill, although they tackle the subject from slightly different angles. Rousseau believes that the fundamental problem facing people s capacity to leave the state of nature and enter a society in which their liberty is protected is the ability to find a form of association that defends and protects the person and goods of each associate with all the common force, and by means of which each one, uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before (Rousseau 53). Man is forced to leave the state of nature because their resistance to the obstacles faced is beginning to fail (Rousseau 52). Mill does not†¦show more content†¦Mill might be tempted to argue that there are aspects of the general will that citizens should be fearful of. One of the forces that Mill identifies as the most stifling towards liberty is the force of the popular opinion. Clear ly, some sort of protection against tyranny of the magistrate is necessary but not enough as there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices (Mill 9). Mill is noticeably placing more emphasis on the individual aspects of freedom as opposed to Rousseau who is more in support of a freedom that only can only be attained through the forfeiting of some these individual liberties in order to become a part of the collective and achieve his version of civil freedom, the most important of all liberties. Diversity of opinions is a highly valued societal good for Mill and he believes this to be an important path to revealing the truths and securing liberty. In ensuring people will enjoy the liberty they deserve, Mill leaves a lot more room for government intervention than Rousseau does in his version of the best society. 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